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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the controversial presidential election in 2000, states have
enacted more restrictive election laws resulting in an increased number
of lawsuits alleging disenfranchisement.' Indiana enacted one of the
most restrictive voter-identification laws in the country,2 which
prompted facial challenges shortly after its enactment.' In Crawford v.
Marion County Election Board,4 the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine the constitutionality of the Indiana law.5
Upholding the constitutionality of the Indiana statute, the Court held that
Indiana's interest in enacting the law justified the minimal burdens the
law imposed on voters.6
f Articles and Comments Editor, University of Miami Law Review; J.D./M.B.A. Candidate
2010, University of Miami School of Law; B.B.A. 2006, University of Miami. I dedicate this
paper to my parents, Michael and Catherine, whose support and guidance made this possible. I'd
like to thank Professor Martha Mahoney for her input and encouragement during the writing
process. Special thanks to Colleen Del Casino for her assistance throughout the editing process.
1. Demian A. Ordway, Disenfranchisement and the Constitution: Finding a Standard that
Works, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1174, 1174-75 (2007).
2. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1642 (2008) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) ("Indiana has adopted one of the most restrictive photo identification requirements in
the country.").
3. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1614.
4. 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).
5. Id. at 1615.
6. Id. at 1623.
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This note argues that Crawford failed to provide the clarity needed
in this growing body of law and, in fact, will create more confusion for
the courts since a majority of the Court neither agreed on the applicable
standard nor on the approach to assess the burdens imposed by state
election laws. Moreover, this note proposes that by misapplying the
standard, the lead opinion created the possibility for states to pass
restrictive election laws purposefully aimed at skewing election results.
Part II of this note presents the relevant case law and social climate
leading up to Crawford while Part III discusses the requirements of Indi-
ana's voter identification law, as well as the procedural posture of Craw-
ford. Additionally, Part III analyzes the evidence before the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana and examines
Judge Barker's handling of the evidence. Crawford's lead and concur-
ring opinions are examined with an emphasis on their application of
precedent and lines of reasoning in Part IV. Part V notes post-Crawford
developments, including related litigation and studies. Finally, Part VI
comments on the broader implications Crawford will have in terms of
providing guidance to the courts and its potential to encourage states to
enact burdensome election laws aimed at skewing election results.
II. PERSPECTIVE: EVOLUTION OF THE STANDARD AND RESURRECTION
OF DISENFRANCHISEMENT CLAIMS
While the right to vote has consistently been recognized as a funda-
mental right,7 the standard for determining the constitutionality of state
election laws has evolved over time.8 In Harper v. Virginia Board of
Elections,9 the Court applied strict scrutiny when holding that a poll tax
was unconstitutional as violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."° Under Harper's analytical framework, the
Court struck down on equal protection grounds numerous state election
laws that burdened the right to vote.t'
7. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992); I11. Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers
Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
8. Compare Harper, 383 U.S. 633 (applying strict scrutiny to an election law burdening the
right to vote), with Burdick, 504 U.S. 428 (evaluating a law prohibiting write-in votes under a
balancing test).
9. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
10. See id.
11. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (holding that Tennessee durational
residence law violates the Equal Protection Clause); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 149 (1972)
("Since the State has failed to establish the requisite justification for this filing-fee system, we
hold that it results in a denial of equal protection of the laws."); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23,
34 (1968) ("But here the totality of the Ohio restrictive laws taken as a whole imposes a burden on
voting and associational rights which we hold is an invidious discrimination, in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.").
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The Court's approach changed significantly, however, when decid-
ing Anderson v. Celebrezze12 and Burdick v. Takushi.13 In Anderson, the
Court set forth a flexible balancing standard to assess the constitutional-
ity of challenged election laws. 4 The Burdick Court adopted and clari-
fied Anderson's balancing test'5 and pronounced that "[e]lection laws
will invariably impose some burden upon individual voters" and "to
subject every voting regulation to strict scrutiny. .. would tie the hands
of States seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and effi-
ciently."' 6 The Court moved away from Harper's notion that strict scru-
tiny must be applied whenever a state election law burdens the right to
vote and adopted a balancing test weighing the burden imposed by the
election law against the State's interest in enacting it.' 7
"In the 1980s and 1990s, disenfranchisement claims were rare."" 8
Since the highly contested presidential election in 2000, however, courts
have seen a dramatic increase in the number of lawsuits alleging that
state election laws are denying citizens the right to vote.' 9 Recently,
challenges to the constitutionality of laws requiring photo identification
for in-person voters were brought in the federal courts.2° Indiana and
Georgia had nearly identical voter-identification laws; however, two
federal courts applying the same constitutional standard rendered differ-
ent judgments.2'
III. CRAWFORD BACKGROUND
A. Indiana's Voting Procedures
Prior to the voter-identification law, Indiana's in-person voting pro-
cedure was much less burdensome. Individuals wanting to exercise their
12. 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (holding Ohio's early filing deadline for independent candidates
unconstitutional).
13. 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (holding Hawaii's prohibition on write-in voting constitutional).
14. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789.
[The Court] must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to
the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks
to vindicate. It then must identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by
the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. In passing judgment,
the Court must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those
interests, it also must consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary
to burden the plaintiff's rights.
Id.
15. See Burdick, 504 U.S. 428.
16. Id. at 433 (citation omitted).
17. See Burdick, 504 U.S. 428.
18. Ordway, supra note 1, at 1174.
19. Id. at 1174-75.
20. Id. at 1175.
21. Id.
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fundamental right would only have to travel to their local precinct and
sign the poll book.2 "There was no requirement that a voter show any
form of identification in order to vote after the prospective voter signed
in with the clerk."'2 3 The voter's signature from the poll book would then
be compared "to the signature contained in the voter registration
records." 24 Members of the precinct election board could challenge vot-
ers suspected of misrepresenting their identity and either political party's
clerk could also challenge an individual's ballot based on signature com-
parison." Individuals caught casting fraudulent ballots could be charged
and convicted of a felony.26 Under this framework, there had not been a
single instance of in-person voter fraud.2 7
Indiana's voter-identification law became effective on January 1,
2006.28 Applying to both primary and general elections,29 the statute
requires a citizen voting in-person or casting an absentee ballot in-per-
son to provide a form of photo identification3 ° that satisfies several spe-
cific conditions.3 For example, the photo identification must be issued
by the United States or the State of Indiana.3 2 Other proof-of-identifica-
tion requirements mandate that the name of the individual appearing on
the photo identification "conforms to the name in the individual's voter
registration record," the identification contains an expiration date, and
the document "is not expired; or expired after the date of the most recent
general election."33
Under certain circumstances, the photo-identification requirements
do not apply.3 4 The statute includes an exception for individuals voting
at the same state-licensed care facilities where he or she resides-the
"nursing home exception."35 Also, absentee voters are exempt from the
photo-identification requirement when "mailing, delivering, or transmit-
ting" their absentee ballots-the "absentee ballot exception. 36 Under
the nursing home and absentee ballot exceptions, "the voter is not
required to provide any proof of identification in order to vote in-person





27. Id. at 792-93.
28. Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631, 642 (2007).
29. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 3-10-1-7.2, 3-11-8-25.1 (West 2006 & Supp. 2009).
30. IND. CODE ANN. § 3-11-8-25.1 (West 2006 & Supp. 2009).
31. IND. CODE ANN. § 3-5-2-40.5 (West 2006).
32. IND. CODE ANN. § 3-5-2-40.5(4) (West 2006).
33. IND. CODE ANN. § 3-5-2-40.5 (West 2006).
34. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 3-11-8-25.1(e) (West 2006 & Supp. 2009).
35. Id.
36. IND. CODE ANN. § 3-11-10-1.2 (West 2006).
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and to have his vote counted."37
Indiana's voter-identification law also establishes a provisional bal-
lot system enabling an individual to vote in-person without photo identi-
fication; however, timely follow-up steps are required in order to have
the provisional ballot counted. Individuals failing to produce acceptable
photo identification may sign the poll book and vote by provisional bal-
lot after signing "an affidavit attesting to the voter's right to vote in that
precinct. ' 38 For the provisional ballot to count, the individual must
"appear before the circuit court clerk or the county election board by
noon on the second Monday following the election to prove the voter's
identity. ' 39 In addition to individuals failing to produce acceptable photo
identification, provisional voting is available to indigent individuals and
those with religious objections to being photographed."n These provi-
sional ballots are not counted, however, unless the voter appears "in per-
son before the circuit court clerk or county election board within 10 days
of the election, to sign an affidavit attesting to indigency or religious
objection to being photographed."4
Promptly after the statute's enactment, two facial challenges were
brought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana seeking a judgment declaring the law unconstitutional and
enjoining its enforcement.42 The plaintiffs alleged that the Indiana law
substantially burdened the fundamental right to vote, discriminated
between different classes of voters, and disproportionately affected dis-
advantaged voters.4 3 The two facial challenges were consolidated, and
the State of Indiana intervened to defend the constitutionality of the
voter identification law.'
The District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment45 finding that the petitioners
did "not introduce evidence of a single, individual Indiana resident who
will be unable to vote as a result of [the voter identification law] or who
will have his or her right to vote unduly burdened by its requirements."46
37. Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 786 (S.D. Ind. 2006).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. IND. CODE ANN. § 3-11.7-5-2.5(c) (West 2006).
41. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1631 (2008) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
42. Id. at 1614 (lead opinion). The Indiana Democratic Party and the Marion County
Democratic Central Committee filed the first suit and the second facial challenge was brought on
behalf of two elected officials and several nonprofit organizations that represented the elderly,
disabled, poor, and minority voters. Id.
43. Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 755, 783-84 (S.D. Ind. 2006).
44. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1614.
45. 458 F. Supp. 2d at 784.
46. Id. at 783.
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On appeal, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed.47 Due to the importance of the right at stake,
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 48 in Crawford to
determine the constitutionality of the Indiana statute. 49
B. Insufficient Evidence: An Examination of Judge Barker's
Evidentiary Decisions
Judge Barker supported her decision to grant the defendants'
motion for summary judgment on evidentiary grounds:
Plaintiffs have failed to submit: (1) evidence of any individuals who
will be unable to vote or who will be forced to undertake appreciable
burdens in order to vote; and (2) any statistics or aggregate data indi-
cating particular groups who will be unable to vote or will be forced
to undertake appreciable burdens in order to vote.50
Describing the plaintiffs' claims as "apocalyptic assertions, 51 Judge
Barker found that the plaintiffs had "totally failed to adduce evidence
establishing that any actual voters will be adversely impacted by [the
voter identification law]. ' '52 An examination of the record, however,
shows that the plaintiffs offered evidence demonstrating that several
individuals were adversely impacted when attempting to comply with
the Indiana law53 as well as a statistical study exhibiting the number of
registered voters without a driver's license or ID card and their demo-
graphic characteristics. 54 Judge Barker's characterization of this evi-
dence trivialized the burdens faced by indigent and elderly voters, and
her rejection of the plaintiffs' statistical report left the Supreme Court
with no evidence of the number of voters facing these burdens.
With respect to elderly voters, the plaintiffs provided evidence of
elderly Indiana residents who have been and will continue to be
adversely impacted by the voter-identification law. 5 For instance, The-
resa Clemente, a 78-year-old Indiana resident originally from Massachu-
setts, stated in her affidavit that "after paying $28 to obtain a certified
47. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007).
48. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1615 ("Because we agreed with their assessment of the
importance of these cases, we granted certiorari.") (citing 128 S. Ct. 33, 34 (2007)).
49. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1613 ("At issue in these cases is the constitutionality of an
Indiana statute requiring citizens voting in person on election day, or casting a ballot in person at
the office of the circuit court clerk prior to election day, to present photo identification issued by
the government.").
50. Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 822 (S.D. Ind. 2006).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 820.
53. See id. at 797-99.
54. See id. at 803.
55. See id. at 797-99.
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copy of her birth certificate from the State of Massachusetts and making
three trips to the [Bureau of Motor Vehicles], she had still not received a
photo ID."56 Additionally, Thelma Ruth Hunter, an 85-year-old Indiana
resident who has voted in-person her entire life was never issued a birth
certificate because "[s]he was born at home in Tennessee"5 7 and, despite
her efforts, she has been unable "to obtain a 'delayed certificate of birth'
from Tennessee. '58 Affidavits from several other elderly voters exper-
iencing similar problems and desiring to vote in-person were also sub-
mitted;59 however, Judge Barker was dismissive concluding that elderly
residents were permitted to vote by absentee ballot6" and the "abrogation
of their personal preferences is not a cognizable injury or hardship."61
Regarding the absentee voting procedure, no evidence was introduced
indicating "that voting absentee would be a burden or hardship for any
of these individuals. 62
In addition to evidence of elderly voters affected by Indiana's
voter-identification statute, the plaintiffs offered evidence of a homeless
individual, Kristjan Kogerma, who stated in his affidavit that he was not
able to obtain a photo-identification card because he had no documented
address-he was homeless.63 Judge Barker's rationale for disregarding
Kogerma's affidavit is suspect and premised on a questionable assump-
tion-perhaps, that is why her reasoning appears as merely a footnote in
56. Id. at 798.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 797-99.
60. When Crawford was decided, there were ten enumerated circumstances permitting an
individual to vote by absentee ballot. IND. CODE ANN. § 3-11-10-24 (West 2006). Under IND.
CODE ANN. § 3-11-10-24(a)(5), all elderly voters are permitted to vote by absentee ballot.
Furthermore, elderly "means a voter who is at least sixty-five (65) years of age." IND. CODE ANN.
§ 3-5-2-16.5 (West 2006).
61. 458 F. Supp. 2d at 823 n.71. It is important to note that many elderly African Americans
were never issued birth certificates because of racial discrimination and oppression. "A particular
problem exists for a large number of elderly African Americans because they were born in a time
when racial discrimination in hospital admissions, especially in the South, as well as poverty, kept
their mothers from giving birth at a hospital." LEIGHTON Ku & MATr BROADDUS, NEW
REQUIREMENT FOR BIRTH CERTIFICATES OR PASSPORTS COULD THREATEN MEDICAID COVERAGE
FOR VULNERABLE BENEFICIARIES: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS (2006) (analyzing the effects of a
provision in the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 requiring all citizens applying for Medicaid to
produce a passport or birth certificate as proof of identification). According to one study,
approximately twenty percent of African Americans born from 1939-40 did not have birth
certificates. S. SHAPIRO, POPULATION INVESTIGATION COMM., DEVELOPMENT OF BIRTH
REGISTRATION AND BIRTH STATISTICS IN THE UNITED STATES 98 (1950), available at http://www.
jstor.org/stable/2172242. Presumably, under Judge Barker's reasoning, elderly African
Americans' inability to vote in-person because of prior discrimination and oppression would
merely be an "abrogation of their personal preferences [and] not a cognizable injury or hardship."
Ind. Democratic Party, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 823 n.71.
62. 458 F. Supp. 2d at 823 n.71.
63. Id. at 823 n.70.
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her seventy-page opinion. Judge Barker's reasons for discounting
Kogerma's affidavit were the following:
First, there is no indication that Mr. Kogerma is registered to vote in
Indiana or has any intention to do so. Second, assuming Mr. Kogerma
is registered to vote in Indiana, his voter registration card can serve as
proof of his Indiana residency. Third, if Mr. Kogerma is indigent, as
his homeless status would suggest, he is explicitly exempted from the
photo identification requirement of [the Indiana law].'
Judge Barker's first reason for disregarding Mr. Kogerma's affida-
vit is unconvincing at best. By attempting to obtain acceptable photo
identification under the Indiana law, Kogerma demonstrated his intent to
vote. Similarly, Kogerma's participation in the lawsuit exhibited his
intent to vote. Registering to vote is effortless compared to obtaining
proper photo identification under the Indiana statute-"there are a host
of ways individuals may register to vote at various venues and offices
including registering by mail. There is no requirement that identification
be shown when one is registering in-person to vote."65 Kogerma's effort
to fulfill the most difficult voting requirement, obtaining acceptable
photo identification under the Indiana law, and his participation in the
lawsuit demonstrated his intent to vote and, contrary to Judge Barker, is
an indication that Kogerma intended to register or was already regis-
tered to vote.
In concluding that Mr. Kogerma was not burdened by the Indiana
statute, Judge Barker assumed that the provisional-voting procedure
mandated by the indigency exception is not itself an appreciable burden
for homeless individuals. In fact, unlike the United States Supreme
Court, not once in her seventy-page opinion did Judge Barker recognize
the additional burdens associated with provisional voting. For instance,
indigent voters must "travel to the county seat every time they wish to
exercise the franchise, and they have to get there within 10 days of the
election."66
In addition to evidence of individuals personally affected by Indi-
ana's voter identification law, the plaintiffs introduced statistical evi-
dence demonstrating the number of individuals in Marion County that
did not possess the required form of photo identification as well as the
64. Id.
65. Id. at 785.
66. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1640 (2008) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added). The fact that 82% of Marion County's provisional ballots were not
counted in the 2004 general election and approximately 85% of all provisional ballots were not
counted statewide suggests that some individuals did not return to the circuit court within the
required time because it was too burdensome. See Ind. Democratic Party, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 788.
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demographic characteristics of those voters.67 The plaintiffs' expert,
Kimball W. Brace, recorded his statistical findings and analysis in the
"Brace Report. ' 68 Brace concluded that "at least 51,000 registered voters
and as many as 141,000 registered voters in Marion County ... [did] not
currently possess a BMV-issued driver's license or photo identifica-
tion."'69 Further, Brace concluded "that registered voters who reside in
census block groups with a median household income of less than
$15,000 are more than twice as likely not to possess photo identifica-
tions as are registered voters who reside in census block groups with a
median household income of more than $55,000.
''70
While lacking "the time and space to discuss the numerous flaws in
Brace's report" Judge Barker proceeded to "highlight the report's most
significant failings. '7  According to Judge Barker, Brace's significant
failings included: "(1) falling to account for voter roll inflation, (2) com-
paring demographic data from different years without qualification or
analysis, (3) drawing obviously inaccurate and illogical conclusions, and
(4) failing to qualify the statistical estimates based on socioeconomic
data."' 72 In light of these failings, Judge Barker concluded that the analy-
67. 458 F. Supp. 2d at 803-09.
68. Id. at 803. The purpose of the Brace Report "was to determine how many registered
voters had a driver's license or ID issued by the BMV, as well as to determine the characteristics
of the registered voters who apparently do not have such licenses or IDs." Kimball W. Brace,
Report on the Matching of Voter Registration and Driver's License Files in Ind. Democratic Party
v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775 (S.D. Ind. 2006) (No. l:05-CV-0634-SEB-VSS), 2005 WL
3536382 [hereinafter Expert Report of Kimball W. Brace].
69. 458 F. Supp. 2d at 803. To determine the number of registered voters that did not
currently possess an Indiana driver's license or ID card, Brace employed several techniques to
match the names appearing on Indiana's voter registration rolls with the names appearing on the
Bureau of Motor Vehicles' records. Expert Report of Kimball W. Brace, supra note 68. A range
of 51,000 to 141,000 registered voters without a driver's license or ID resulted from the various
matching criterion Brace employed during the study, i.e., the "stringent match criteria" and
"loosened match criteria." Id.
70. 458 F. Supp. 2d at 803.
[T]o determine the demographic characteristics of individuals on either the BMV or
the registered voter lists, we have taken their street address and geo-coded the
census block upon which they live. The geo-coding process is a procedure where an
individual's street address is matched to the appropriate street and street address
range, which in turn is associated with the census block on one or the other side of
the street. In much the same way that demographic and list maintenance companies
perform their work, we have subscribed the attributes of the census block to the
individuals living there, on the basis of the demographic percentages coming from
the 2000 Census.
Expert Report of Kimball W. Brace, supra note 68.
71. 458 F. Supp. 2d at 803.
72. Id. Judge Barker relied on the expert report of Jonathan N. Katz in finding that Brace
failed to qualify his statistical estimates based on socioeconomic data. Id. at 806. Katz found,
among other things, that the Brace Report suffers from aggregation bias and fails to indicate
whether "the socioeconomic results are statistically significant" or if "any generally accepted
estimates of significance or uncertainty" were performed. Id.
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sis and conclusions in the Brace Report were "utterly incredible and
unreliable" 73 and, therefore inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence
702.74
In summary, Judge Barker claimed that the plaintiffs had failed to
prove that the Indiana law adversely impacts voters. 75 However, there
were numerous affidavits signed by elderly and homeless voters attest-
ing to their difficulties in obtaining the photo identification required by
the statute.76 Judge Barker dismissed these claims on grounds that
exceptions applied to these particular individuals; however, Judge
Barker did not address the potential burdens associated with these
exceptions.77 Regarding the plaintiffs' statistical evidence, Judge Barker
rejected the Brace Report which left the United States Supreme Court
with no evidence pertaining to "the number of registered voters without
photo identification, 78  thereby facilitating the possibility for
disenfranchisement.
IV. ANALYSIS: THE DISENFRANCHISED MUST WAIT
A. A Judgment but No Clear Standard
In Crawford, although a majority concurred in judgment,79 the
Court was split on the applicable standard. This disagreement stemmed
from different interpretations of Burdick v. Takushi.8 ° The lead opinion,
authored by Justice Stevens,8' was premised on the notion that Burdick
endorsed and adhered to the flexible balancing test set forth in Anderson
v. Celebrezze.82 According to Justice Stevens, the Court must "weigh the
asserted injury to the right to vote against the 'precise interests put for-
73. 458 F. Supp. 2d at 803.
74. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient
facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the
case.
FED. R. EvID. 702.
75. Ind. Democratic Party, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 820.
76. Id. at 797-99, 823.
77. See id. at 822-23.
78. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1622 (2008) (lead opinion).
79. Id. at 1615 (affirming the District Court's and Seventh Circuit's conclusions that the
evidence in the record was not sufficient to support a facial attack on the validity of Indiana's
voter identification law).
80. 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
81. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy joined Justice Stevens in the lead opinion.
82. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1616 n.8.
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ward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule.' "83
The burden, however slight, "must be justified by relevant and legiti-
mate state interests 'sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation.' "84
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia,85 however, was adamant that the
Burdick Court did not adopt Anderson's balancing test. Instead, "Bur-
dick forged Anderson's amorphous 'flexible standard' into something
resembling an administrable rule" with a "two-track approach."86 Under
Justice Scalia's reasoning, the applicable standard is a "deferential
'important regulatory interests' standard for nonsevere, nondiscrimina-
tory restrictions, reserving strict scrutiny for laws that severely restrict
the right to vote."87
When reexamining Burdick, it is clear that the two-track standard
advocated in Justice Scalia's concurrence was a significant departure
from precedent.88 Justice Scalia's support for the two-track standard
consisted of examples the Burdick Court used merely to clarify the
proper application of Anderson.89 To be clear, the Burdick Court never
set forth a two-track standard, in fact, the Court was explicit in endors-
ing and applying Anderson's balancing test: "The appropriate standard
for evaluating a claim that a state law burdens the right to vote is set
forth in Anderson. Applying that standard, we conclude .... ."' Due to
Justice Scalia's departure from precedent in Crawford, the Court lacked
a clear majority holding with respect to the applicable standard for eval-
uating election law challenges.9"
B. Assessing the Burden: A Divergence of "Views"
Although a majority did not apply the same standard, a majority of
the Court did conclude that the burden imposed by Indiana's voter-iden-
tification law was minimal. As this section will demonstrate, however,
the lead and concurring opinions differed on how they assessed the bur-
den and proceeded on questionable assumptions and flawed premises.
When analyzing the burdens imposed by the Indiana law, Justice
Stevens emphasized the fact that the photo-identification cards were
free; otherwise, the statute would be unconstitutional under Harper.92
83. Id. at 1616 (quoting Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434).
84. Id. (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288-89 (1992)).
85. Justices Thomas and Alito joined Justice Scalia's concurring opinion.
86. Id. at 1624 (Scalia, J., concurring).
87. Id. (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433-34 (1992)).
88. See Burdick, 504 U.S. 428 (holding that election laws prohibiting write-in voting do not
violate a voter's rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments).
89. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1624 (citing Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434).
90. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 438.
91. See Crawford, 128 S. Ct. 1610.
92. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) ("We conclude that a State
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When assessing the burden imposed by a poll tax in Harper, the Court
held that it is unconstitutional to make the "payment of any fee an elec-
toral standard." 93 To obtain a free photo-identification card under the
statute, however, a person must first present required documentation,
such as a birth certificate or U.S. passport. 94 Since obtaining the required
documentation itself costs money,95 "voters must pay at least one fee to
get the ID necessary to cast a regular ballot."96 Justice Stevens failed to
elaborate on the required document fee, thereby implying that a fee, one
step removed, satisfies Harper's clear mandate.
Justice Stevens assessed the alleged burdens from two different
perspectives-a statewide standpoint and a narrower focus on the poor,
elderly, homeless, and those with religious objections. 97 From the
broader perspective, the burden of acquiring a photo ID was merely an
inconvenience, not a substantial burden on the right to vote. 98 Mindful
of a potentially disparate impact on the poor, elderly, homeless, and
individuals with religious objections to being photographed,99 Justice
Stevens then analyzed the burdens imposed by the statute on these
groups separately.
While recognizing that the poor and elderly may have more diffi-
culty obtaining the required documents,"° Justice Stevens reasoned that
those eligible to cast provisional ballots will mitigate the severity of that
burden. 101 Although Justice Stevens did not find the additional require-
ment placed on provisional voters (traveling to the circuit court clerk's
office within ten days of the election to execute the required affidavit)
especially burdensome,10 2 empirical data suggested otherwise. 103 For
example, in the 2007 municipal elections in Marion County, Indiana,
only two out of the thirty-four provisional voters made it to the county
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes the
affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard.").
93. Harper, 383 U.S. at 666 (emphasis added).
94. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1621 n.17 (lead opinion).
95. Id. at 1631 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Indiana counties charge anywhere from $3 to $12 for
a birth certificate" and "[tihe total fees for a passport, moreover, are up to about $100.").
96. Id. at 1631.
97. See id. at 1620-21 (lead opinion).
98. Id. at 1621 ("For most voters who need [photo IDs], the inconvenience of making a trip to
the BMV, gathering the required documents, and posing for a photograph surely does not qualify
as a substantial burden on the right to vote, or even represent a significant increase over the usual
burdens of voting.").
99. Id.
100. Id. Again, Justice Stevens does not address the fee required to obtain the necessary
documents with respect to Harper's clear mandate prohibiting the payment of any fee as an
electoral standard. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966).
101. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1621.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1632 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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clerk's office within 10 days to execute the required affidavit, i.e., only
two of the thirty-four provisional votes were counted.' 04Furthermore,
one class of voters permitted to vote by provisional ballots, the indi-
gent, 105 is less likely to drive or even own a car, and twenty-one counties
in Indiana had no public transportation system at all."06 In light of this,
Justice Stevens concluded that based on the evidence in the record it was
not possible to quantify "the magnitude of the burden on this narrow
class of voters."'
10 7
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia, unlike Justice Stevens, refused to
make an additional assessment of the burden imposed on a particular
class of voters under the premise that "our precedents refute the view
that individual impacts are relevant to determining the severity of the
burden" °8 imposed by "generally applicable, nondiscriminatory voting
regulation[s]."10 9 The voting restrictions in the three cases Justice Scalia
cited to support this sweeping statement, 1'0 however, are easily distin-
guishable and far less onerous than Indiana's voter-identification law.
For example, the law challenged in Timmons "prohibit[ed] a candidate
from appearing on the ballot as the candidate of more than one
party" 1l'-that law in no way burdened an individual's fundamental
right to vote like the Indiana statute. Even more damaging to Justice
Scalia's broad pronouncement is the Court's own precedent, particularly
Lubin v. Panish."2 In Lubin, a generally applicable, nondiscriminatory
California voting law required a filing fee from all candidates. 1t 3 The
Court assessed the burden imposed by this voting law on the indigent
petitioner individually,1 14 as well as on the general class of indigent citi-
104. Id.
105. IND. CODE ANN. § 3-11.7-5-2.5(c) (West 2006).
106. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1630 n.15 (citing Indiana Public Transit: Annual Report 2006,
p. 29, http://www.in.gov/indot/files/INDOT_2006.pdf). Moreover, the American Public
Transportation Association suggests that 13 additional counties in Indiana lack any form of public
transportation. Id.
107. Id. at 1622 (lead opinion). As mentioned supra Part HIB, Judge Barker's exclusion of the
Brace Report left the Court with practically no evidence to assess the magnitude of the disparate
impacts the Indiana statute imposed on certain classes of voters.
108. Id. at 1625 (Scalia, J., concurring).
109. Id.
110. See Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581 (2005) (challenging Oklahoma's election law
creating a semi closed primary); Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997)
(challenging Minnesota's election law prohibiting candidates from appearing on a ballot as a
candidate in more than one political party); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (challenging
Hawaii's election law prohibiting write-in votes).
111. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 354.
112. 415 U.S. 709 (1974).
113. Id. at 710.
114. Id. at 714 ("The petitioner stated on oath that he is without assets or income and cannot
pay the $701.60 filing fee although he is otherwise legally eligible to be a candidate on the
primary ballot.").
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zens 1 5 when determining that the law was unconstitutional. 16
Relying on this flawed premise, Justice Scalia determined that the
Indiana statute imposed a single burden uniformly on all voters," 7 "[t]he
burden of acquiring, possessing, and showing a free photo identifica-
tion,""' 8 and refused to address the disparate impacts the law imposed
upon particular classes of voters." 9 From a statewide perspective, Jus-
tice Scalia concluded that the burden imposed by the statute was "simply
not severe, because it does not 'even represent a significant increase
over the usual burdens of voting.' "120
C. Justifiable State Interests: We'll Take Your Word for It
After finding that Indiana's voter-identification law imposed a min-
imal burden on all Indiana voters, Justice Stevens proceeded to deter-
mine whether that burden was "justified by relevant and legitimate state
interests 'sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation' ",121 as required
under the flexible balancing standard. 122 Justice Stevens determined that
Indiana enacted the statute to pursue several legitimate interests: (1)
deterring, detecting, and preventing voter fraud; (2) modernizing its
election procedures; and (3) safeguarding voter confidence. 23 Justice
Stevens individually analyzed each of Indiana's asserted interests 124 and
concluded that they justified the burden imposed by the law. 12' A careful
examination of Justice Stevens' analysis and the evidence he relied on,
however, casts significant doubt as to (1) whether the State's interests in
enacting the voter identification law were legitimate and justified and (2)
whether Justice Stevens correctly applied the balancing test.
Although Indiana had a legitimate interest in combating voter
fraud, the Indiana statute only addressed one type of fraud, in-person
voter impersonation. 126 "The record contains no evidence of any such
115. Id. at 718 ("The absence of any alternative means of gaining access to the ballot
inevitably renders the California system exclusionary as to some aspirants.") (emphasis added).
116. Id. ("Accordingly, we hold that in the absence of reasonable alternative means of ballot
access, a State may not, consistent with constitutional standards, require from an indigent
candidate filing fees he cannot pay.") (emphasis added).
117. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1625 (2008) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("what petitioners view as the law's several light and heavy burdens are no more than
the different impacts of the single burden that the law uniformly imposes on all voters").
118. Id. at 1627.
119. See id. at 1625.
120. Id. at 1627 (citation omitted).
121. Id. at 1616 (lead opinion) (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288-89 (1992)).
122. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
123. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1617.
124. Id. at 1617-20.
125. Id. at 1623.
126. Id. at 1618.
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fraud actually occurring in Indiana at any time in its history. ' 27 When
searching for instances of in-person voter impersonation "documented
throughout [our] Nation's history,"128 Justice Stevens only discovered
"scattered instances of in-person voter fraud,"1 29 and those instances
were rather weak.130 For example, after a hotly contested election in
Washington in 2004, an investigation was conducted confirming only
one instance of in-person voter fraud.'3 Additionally, Justice Stevens
was persuaded by "Indiana's own negligence" resulting in voter registra-
tion rolls that contained thousands of names of individuals who moved,
died, or otherwise became ineligible to vote.'3 2 Nonetheless, Justice Ste-
vens offered no evidence linking Indiana's voter rolls and the voter iden-
tification statute to a decrease in in-person voter fraud.'3 3
When assessing the State's interest in modernizing its election pro-
cedures, Justice Stevens concluded this interest was justified based on
two federal statutes' 34 and a report from the Commission on Federal
Election Reform' 35 (the "Carter-Baker Report").136 Justice Stevens rea-
soned that by accepting photo identification as a valid means of identifi-
cation in two federal statutes, Congress indicated that photo
identification was "one effective method of establishing a voter's quali-
fication to vote."' 137 Justice Stevens' own rationale, however, actually
undermines Indiana's justification for enacting the voter-identification
law. In the same two statutes, Congress also approved several much less
burdensome forms of identification that the Indiana law strictly prohib-
its 138-bank statements and paychecks. 139
Justice Stevens also relied on a portion of the Carter-Baker
Report1 40 recommending photo-identification requirements for voting as
127. Id. at 1619.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1619 n.12.
130. Id. at 1619 n.l I (citing an example of in-person voter fraud occurring in 1868 in the New
York City elections of William (Boss) Tweed).
131. Id. at 1619 n.12.
132. Id. at 1619-20. The Federal Government actually sued Indiana for its failure to keep its
voter registration rolls in compliance with the National Voter Registration Act. Id. at 1620.
133. Id. at 1620 ("[T]he fact of inflated voter rolls does provide a neutral and
nondiscriminatory reason supporting the State's decision to require photo identification.").
134. Id. at 1618. The two federal statutes Stevens cited were the National Voter Registration
Act (NVRA) and the Help America Vote Act (HAVA).
135. The Commission on Federal Election Reform, a private, twenty-one member bipartisan
body, released the Carter-Baker Report on Sept. 19, 2005. Overton, supra note 28, at 633.
136. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1618.
137. Id. at 1618.
138. See IND. CODE ANN. § 3-5-2-40.5 (West 2006).
139. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1618.
140. The Carter-Baker Report was a part of the record in these cases. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at
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support for Indiana's interest in election modernization. 141 By relying on
only two provisions of the Carter-Baker Report in his analysis, Justice
Stevens failed to recognize significant differences between the Indiana
law and the Carter-Baker Report. For instance, the Report's photo-iden-
tification recommendation was expressly conditioned on a phase-in
period142 aimed at reducing the burdens on the right to vote, 143 whereas
"[Indiana] conspicuously rejected the Report's phase-in recommenda-
tion."'144 More damaging though, was Carter and Baker's statement that
Georgia's voting law, which like the Indiana law "required photo identi-
fication as an absolute condition to vote,"' 45 was discriminatory. 146
The only evidence Justice Stevens provided in support of Indiana's
interest in protecting voter confidence was a statement taken from the
Carter-Baker Report: "the 'electoral system cannot inspire public confi-
dence if no safeguards exist to deter or detect fraud or to confirm the
identity of voters."" 47 While cognizant of Indiana's preexisting safe-
guards, such as severe criminal penalties for voter fraud, 148 Justice Ste-
vens conducted no analysis to determine whether the additional voter
confidence inspired by Indiana's voter-identification law justified the
burdens the statute imposed. 
14 9
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia did not set forth an analysis of
Indiana's asserted interests. Instead, after determining that the burden
was minimal 1 0 and the statute was nondiscriminatory,' 5 ' Justice Scalia
concluded that Indiana's interests were sufficient to satisfy the "deferen-
tial important regulatory interests standard."' 52
1618. The Report contained eighty-seven recommendations addressing the country's "most
pressing election problems." Overton, supra note 28, at 633.
141. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1618.
142. Id. at 1644 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The Carter-Baker Commission conditioned its
recommendation upon the States' willingness to ensure that the requisite photo IDs 'be easily
available and issued free of charge' and that the requirement be 'phased in' over two federal
election cycles.") (emphasis in original) (quoting Carter-Baker Report, at App. 139, 140).
143. Id. at 1640 (Souter, J., dissenting).
144. Id.
145. Overton, supra note 28, at 639.
146. Jimmy Carter & James A. Baker III, Voting Reform is in the Cards, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23,
2005, at Al.
147. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1620 (lead opinion).
148. Id. at 1619 ("the Indiana Criminal Code punishing such conduct as a felony"). The Court
has previously determined that a State's criminal laws are more than adequate to detect and deter
voter fraud. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 353 (1972) ("Our conclusion that the waiting
period is not the least restrictive means necessary for preventing fraud is bolstered by the
recognition that Tennessee has at its disposal a variety of criminal laws that are more than
adequate to detect and deter whatever fraud may be feared.").
149. See Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1620.
150. Id. at 1624 (Scalia, J., concurring).
151. Id. at 1625-26.
152. Id. at 1625-27.
[Vol. 64:713
2010] CRAWFORD V. MARION COUNTY ELECTION BOARD 729
V. POST-CRAWFORD DEVELOPMENTS
A. Related Litigation
After Crawford, Indiana's voter-identification law was challenged
again in League of Women Voters of Indiana v. Rokita. 53 This time,
however, there were no allegations of disenfranchisement; instead, the
plaintiffs sought a judicial declaration that the voter-identification law
violated the Indiana Constitution.' 54 The Court of Appeals of Indiana
held that the Indiana law violated the Equal Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Indiana Constitution by exempting absentee voters and
residents of state-licensed care facilities that are precincts while requir-
ing in-person voters and residents of state-licensed care facilities that are
not precincts to comply with the law. 55 In other words, the absentee
ballot and nursing home exceptions rendered the Indiana statute void,
not the disparate impacts the law imposed on the poor and elderly. Thus,
even if the Supreme Court of Indiana affirms this judgment, the dispa-
rate impacts on the poor and elderly may persist. Even worse, in passing
a new voter-identification law to comply with League of Women Voters,
the Indiana General Assembly may significantly increase the burdens
imposed on elderly voters.
For instance, the Indiana General Assembly may pass a voter-iden-
tification law without the absentee ballot and nursing home exceptions.
By removing the absentee ballot exception, the law would undermine
the rationale in Crawford for finding that elderly voters were not bur-
dened.' 56 Put differently, by requiring absentee voters to produce photo
identification, 157 Judge Barker's "absentee ballot alternative" that elimi-
nated the burdens faced by elderly voters attempting to locate their birth
certificates,1 58 assuming one was even issued,' 59 would no longer exist.
These burdens are further amplified when dispensing with the nursing
home exception because a larger number of elderly voters would be sub-
ject to the photo-identification requirement. Since the Crawford Court
153. 2009 WL 2973120 (Ind. App. Sept. 17, 2009).
154. Id. at * 1. The League of Women Voters of Indiana and the League of Women Voters of
Indianapolis filed suit against the Secretary of State of Indiana alleging that Indiana's voter
identification law violated Indiana Constitution Article 2, Section 2 and Article 1, Section 23. Id.
155. Id. at *15. The Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Indiana Constitution
provides: "The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or
immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens." IND. CONST. art.
1, § 23.
156. See discussion supra Part IH.B.
157. One potential method of implementation is by requiring absentee voters to include a
photocopy of their photo identification with their absentee ballots.
158. See discussion supra Part IH.B.
159. See supra note 61 (discussing the non-issuance of birth certificates to African Americans
due to racial discrimination and oppression that prevented child birth in hospitals).
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found that the Indiana law's absentee ballot exception mitigated the bur-
dens faced by elderly voters, it is unclear whether the heavier burdens
imposed on the elderly under this potential legislation would be uncon-
stitutional under federal election law.
B. Related Studies
In addition to the related litigation, Crawford spurred empirical
studies attempting to measure the disparate impacts the Indiana law
imposed on the indigent, minority and elderly voters. Two of these stud-
ies, one conducted by Matt Barreto 6 ° and the other by Michael Pitts,'
6t
were cited in an amicus brief filed in League of Women Voters by a
notable group of social scientists.162 While the results of these studies
offer increased proof of voter disenfranchisement, there are still missing
links in the evidence needed to satisfy Crawford's mandate.
The Barreto study identified the classes of registered voters that
were less likely to have the photo identification required under Indiana's
law. 163 To simplify, the study found that indigent, minority and elderly
voters were significantly less likely to possess the required identifica-
tion."6 It is clear, however, that alone, this evidence fails to satisfy
Crawford because the Court concluded that the acts necessary to obtain
the required identification were not unduly burdensome.' 65 Thus, under
the Court's reasoning, it does not matter that a larger percentage of indi-
gent, minority and elderly voters must obtain the necessary identification
to have their vote count, unless there is additional evidence that these
classes of voters face substantial burdens in the process.
Michael Pitts analyzed the 2008 general election results to deter-
mine whether the Indiana law disparately impacted the indigent. 166 The
study surveyed nearly every county in Indiana and found that approxi-
160. Matt A. Barreto, Stephen A. Nufilo & Gabriel R. Sanchez, The Disproportionate Impact of
Voter ID Requirements on the Electorate-New Evidence from Indiana, 42 PS: POL. ScL. & POL.
111 (2009).
161. Michael J. Pitts & Matthew D. Neumann, Documenting Disfranchisement: Voter
Identification at Indiana's 2008 General Election (forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssm.
comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1465529.
162. Brief for Lonna Rae Atkeson et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, League of
Women Voters of Indiana v. Rokita, Appellate Case No. 49A02-0901-CV-00040 (Ind. Nov. 9,
2009).
163. Barreto, supra note 160.
164. Id.
165. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1621 (2008) ("For most voters
who need [the required identification], the inconvenience of making a trip to the BMV, gathering
the required documents, and posing for a photograph surely does not qualify as a substantial
burden on the right to vote, or even represent a significant increase over the usual burdens of
voting.").
166. Pitts, supra note 161.
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mately 1,039 provisional ballots were cast due to a lack of valid photo
identification, but only 137 of those ballots were counted. 167 Even
though approximately eighty-six percent of the identification related
provisional ballots were not counted, this evidence is insufficient under
Crawford to prove the magnitude of the burden imposed on the indigent
because of two unknowns: the reasons these ballots were not counted,
and the number of indigent voters casting these ballots.' 68 Thus, the
number of identification related provisional ballots not counted because
the additional travel requirement was not met is unknown and even if it
were known, it cannot be determined which of these provisional voters
were indigent.' 69 After all, nonindigent individuals that forgot their IDs
may also cast provisional ballots and fail to return.
According to the Amici, the combined results of the two studies
will erode the public's confidence in legitimate elections over time.
170
While this may be true, it is unlikely that the combined results will sat-
isfy Crawford's evidentiary mandate. Although the Barreto study indi-
cates the percentage of registered indigent, minority and elderly voters
lacking the required identification, this finding is an insufficient link to
the voters casting the identification related provisional ballots that were
not counted in Pitts' study. In other words, the probability that certain
classes of voters lack acceptable photo identification does not prove that
these same voters cast the provisional ballots in Pitts' study.
To satisfy this deficiency, it would be ideal to examine the provi-
sional ballots to determine the reasons they were not counted as well as
personal information that could be used to determine whether the voter
was indigent.17' Unfortunately, actually obtaining these ballots has been
167. Id. It should be noted that some voters have been unlawfully denied provisional ballots.
For instance, approximately twelve Indiana nuns lacking appropriate photo identification "weren't
given provisional ballots [at the 2008 primary election] because it would be impossible to get
them to a motor vehicle branch and back in the 10-day time frame allotted by the law." Deborah
Hastings, Indiana Nuns Lacking ID Denied at Poll by Fellow Sister, Associated Press, May 6,
2008, http://www.breitbart.comarticle.php?id=D9OGBCNOO&showarticle=l. Thus, the results
of Pitts' study do not include voters that showed up to their precinct to vote and were denied
provisional ballots in violation of the law.
168. In fact, it is almost impossible to determine why these ballots were not counted since
"Indiana's provisional balloting materials have been deemed off-limits to the public and
legislation that would have provided public access to provisional balloting materials was vetoed
by the governor in May of 2009." Pitts, supra note 161.
169. Under the reasoning in Crawford, determining the number of provisional voters that are
elderly is less significant since these voters may also vote by absentee ballot where no form of
photo identification is required. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1622 (2008).
170. Brief for Lonna Rae Atkeson et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, League of
Women Voters of Indiana v. Rokita, Appellate Case No. 49A02-0901-CV-00040 (Ind. Nov. 9,
2009).
171. Again, determining the number of provisional ballots cast by elderly voters is less
significant under Crawford. See supra note 169.
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problematic not only in Indiana, 72 but also across the country.17 3 To
complicate matters, the retention period for federal election records is
twenty-two months. 174 Thus, in the absence of a lawsuit, this potential
evidence of voter disenfranchisement may be destroyed with the passage
of time.
Moreover, obtaining the provisional ballots would not quantify the
Indiana law's chilling effect on voter participation-the number of vot-
ers without valid identification on the day of the election that decided
not to vote provisionally. The empirical studies attempting to measure
this effect have generated "substantial differences in the results, and sub-
stantial disputes about the validity of each approach."' 75 Thus, while the
amount and type of evidence needed to prevail under Crawford is
unclear, it is reasonably certain that the post-Crawford studies, to date,
remain insufficient.
VI. COMMENT
In view of increasing disenfranchisement litigation1 76 and federal
courts' inconsistent application of the standard for determining the con-
stitutionality of voter-identification laws,177 the Court had a perfect
opportunity to clarify the confusion by pronouncing a clear application
of the standard in Crawford. However, the Court failed-a majority did
not even agree on the same standard. 78 Moreover, the Crawford deci-
sion will instill further confusion because the Court took different
approaches when assessing the burden.179 Justice Scalia's broad state-
ment regarding the method for assessing the burden imposed by state
172. There has been an inconsistent disclosure of provisional ballot materials in Indiana. When
analyzing the 2008 primary election, Michael Pitts successfully obtained "documents related to
provisional ballots ... from more than half of the counties who reported provisional ballots having
been cast." Michael J. Pitts, Empirically Assessing the Impact of Photo Identification at the Polls
Through an Examination of Provisional Balloting, 24 J.L. & POL. 475, 478 (2008). When,
however, analyzing the 2008 general election, Michael Pitts was not able to obtain any of the
provisional ballot materials. See Pitts, supra note 161.
173. See, e.g., Advancement Project, Provisional Voting: Fail-Safe Voting or Trapdoor to
Disenfranchisement (Sept. 2008), http://www.advancementproject.org/ourwork/power-and-
democracy/voter-protection/view.php?content-vpid=69 (noting that out of the six counties in
Ohio where provisional ballot information was requested, three counties refused to provide any
information citing HAVA as the reason for nondisclosure).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 1974 (2006).
175. Justin Levitt, Brennan Center for Justice, Fast Facts on the Impact of Photo ID: The Data
(Apr. 2008), http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/Democracy/._%201D-related%20stats.pdf.
176. Ordway, supra note 1, at 1175.
177. Id.
178. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).
179. Compare Crawford, 128 S. Ct. 1610 (lead opinion), with Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1624-27
(Scalia, J., concurring).
[Vol. 64:713
2010] CRAWFORD V. MARION COUNTY ELECTION BOARD 733
election laws 80 was contrary to the Court's precedent."8' Based on a
flawed premise, Scalia's concurrence casts doubt on the proper perspec-
tive for assessing the burden imposed by state election laws. 8 2 Like the
applicable standard, the Crawford Court failed to provide courts with a
clear rule for assessing the burdens imposed by state election laws.
Although Justice Stevens was correct when determining that the
flexible balancing standard applied, 8 3 he administered it improperly.
The standard required Indiana to justify the burdens the law imposed on
its voters with "relevant and legitimate state interests 'sufficiently
weighty to justify the limitation.' ""84 When administering the balancing
test, however, Justice Stevens found that Indiana was justified based on
merely abstract interests. The scant evidence Justice Stevens relied upon
offered only meager support and actually undermined Indiana's asser-
tions. 85 By finding Indiana justified in the abstract, Justice Stevens
departed from the precedential mandate requiring a finding that interests
are legitimate and sufficiently weighty. Justice Stevens' departure paves
the way for states to pass restrictive election laws purposefully aimed at
skewing election results so long as the law is masked in abstract
greatness. '86
The Court specifically limited the holding to facial challenges,
87
thereby leaving the possibility of future as-applied challenges' 88 by poor
and elderly voters open and expected.'89 Although the Crawford Court
was not confronted with an as-applied challenge, the Court offered no
guidance, in dicta, either on the amount or type of proof necessary to
180. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1625 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The Indiana photo-identification
law is a generally applicable, nondiscriminatory voting regulation, and our precedents refute the
view that individual impacts are relevant to determining the severity of the burden it imposes.").
181. See, e.g., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974).
182. See Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1624-27.
183. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992). It should be noted that some scholars have
argued that these laws are modem day poll taxes thereby suggesting that an analysis under
Harper, not Burdick, is more appropriate. See, e.g., Daniel P. Tokaji, Op-Ed., Are Voter ID Laws
the New Poll Tax?, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2007.
184. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1616 (lead opinion) (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279,
288-89 (1992)).
185. See Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1617-21.
186. Election Law Blog, http://electionlawblog.org/archives/010701.html (Apr. 28, 2008,
08:17).
187. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1623 (Indiana's interests "are therefore sufficient to defeat
petitioners' facial challenge to [the Indiana law].") (emphasis added).
188. Channeling election law cases into as-applied challenges has been a recent trend of the
Court. See Election Law Blog, http://electionlawblog.org/archives/010701.html (Apr. 28, 2008,
08:17 EST).
189. Ian Urbina, Decision is Likely to Spur Voter ID Laws in More States, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
29, 2008, at A 1l.
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succeed in an as-applied challenge to voter-identification laws. 90 Even
worse, the Court was silent on the amount or type of proof necessary to
succeed in facial challenges to voter-identification laws. This lack of
guidance, during a period where more states are passing these laws, will
inevitably split the courts as to the amount and type of evidence required
to succeed at either a facial or an as-applied challenge.
With the 2008 election then imminent, the Court was clear on at
least one point-the disenfranchised must wait.
190. See Crawford, 128 S. Ct. 1610.
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